investigation of the Brookings Institution on "Income and Social Progress", which sees as the only solution of the present difficulties a lowering of commodity prices without further restriction of mass purchasing power. This innocent position contains the whole capitalistic dilemma, and this in spite of the fact that it is a false statement of the problem. The really essential thing in capitalism is the capitalist purchasing power, which has to be increased, but which can only be increased through the restriction of "mass purchasing power". In other words, the lowering of commodity prices means nothing more than the continuance of accumulation. So that Moulton says for the Brookings Institution practically only this: In order to profit. And this more can only be driven out of the present difficulties a lowering of commodity prices with workers, continuance of accumulation, so that A1oulton says for the out further restriction of mass purchasing power. This of the world, there can hardly be any question of social security: hope is to take the place, of have cut wages, lengthened the working day, increased the for research purposes.

Capital knows only one way out of the crisis: more profit. And this more can only be driven out of the workers. Since the NRA went under, more than 20,000 firms have cut wages, lengthened the working day, increased the intensity of the labor process. Unemployment has not essentially increased. This year's relief receipts have been set at $1,227,973,573, as compared with $1,013,069,738 in the corresponding ten months of last year. Today relief is being cut everywhere, often more than 10 percent. The unemployed on relief jobs receive wages which are only a little more than the relief rates. The more the workers are impoverished, however, the more talk is heard of social security: hope is to take the place of bread. But the capitalists know, better than all the social reformers, what is really going on, and one such social reformer recently received from Henry Ford the ironic but no less pertinent answer: "You can't make security one-sided; who is going to secure the securities?" and since the "securities" are still the lords of the world, there can hardly be any question that they will first make themselves secure.

Factory employment since March 1935 is estimated to have dropped 1.4 points and pay rolls to have declined 4.2 points. In view of this difference, capital breathes for the moment somewhat more freely. But the breathing spell is brief; soon capitalism will again strike about itself like a drowning man, and one will be very patriotic and speak enthusiastically of a new world war.

The yellower and more leatherly the skin of the mummified Lenin grows, and the higher the statistically determined number of visitors to the Lenin Mausoleum, the less are people concerned about the real Lenin and his historical significance. More and more monuments are erected to his memory, more and more motion pictures turned out in which he is the central figure, more and more books written about him, and the Russian confectioners mold sweetmeats in forms which bear his features. And yet the faded images of the faces on the chocolate Lenins is matched by the unclarity and the improbability of the stories which are told about him. Though the Lenin Institute in Moscow may publish his collected works, they no longer have any meaning beside the fantastic legends which have formed around his name. As soon as people began to concern themselves with Lenin's collar-buttons, they also ceased to bother about his ideas. Everyone then fashions his own Lenin, and if not after his own image, at any rate after his own desires. What the Napoleonic legend is to France, and the legend of Fredericus Rex to Germany, the Lenin legend is to the new Russia. Just as people once absolutely refused to believe in the death of Napoleon, and just as they hallucinated for the resurrection of Fredericus Rex, so in Russia still today there are people who are pleased to believe that the "little father Czar" has not died, but continues to indulge his insatiable appetite in demanding from them ever fresh tribute. Others light eternal lamps under the picture of Lenin; to them he is a saint, a redeemer to whom one prays for aid. Millions of eyes stare at millions of the pictures; as we see in Lenin the Russian Moses, St. George, Ulysses, Hercules, God or Devil. The Lenin cult has become a new religion before which even the atheistic communists gladly bend the knee; it makes life easier in every respect. Lenin appears to them as the father of the Soviet Republic, the man who made victory possible for the revolution, the great leader without whom they themselves would not exist. But not only in Russia and not only in popular legend, but also to a large part of the Marxist intelligentsia throughout the world, the Russian Revolution has become a world event so closely bound up with the genius of Lenin that one gets the impression that without him that revolution and hence also world history might possibly have taken an essentially different course. A truly objective analysis of the Russian Revolution, however, will at once reveal the untenability of such an idea.

"The assertion that history is made by great men is from a theoretical standpoint wholly unfounded". Such are the
words in which Lenin himself turns on the legend which insists on making him alone responsible for the success of the Russian Revolution. He considered the World War determining as regards the direct cause of its outbreak and for the time of its occurrence. Yes, without that war, he says, the revolution would possibly have been postponed for 'a year longer'. The idea that the outbreak and the course of the Russian Revolution depended in very large measure on Lenin necessarily implies a complete identification of the revolution with the taking over of power by the Bolsheviks. Trotsky has made a remark to the effect that the entire credit for the success of the October uprising belongs to Lenin; against the opposition of almost all his party friends, the resolution for insurrection was carried by him alone. But the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks did not give to the revolution the spirit of Lenin; on the contrary, Lenin had so completely adapted himself to the necessities of the revolution that practically he fulfilled the task of that class which he ostensively combatted. Of course it is often asserted that with the taking over of state power by the Bolsheviks, the originally bourgeois-democratic revolution was forthwith converted into the social-international one. But is it really possible for anyone seriously to believe that a single political act is capable of taking the place of a whole historical development? It is true that from February to October--i.e., from March to November--the agrarian question was not even mentioned. Twisted like a finger has had to be extended, there will soon be snatching for the whole hand. The further worsening of the peasants' situation during the war, the defeat of the czarist armies on the fronts, the growing revolt in the cities, the czarist policy in which all reason was thrown overboard, the general dilemmas resulting to all classes of society, led to the February revolution, which first of all finally brought about the violent solution of the agrarian question, which had been a burning one during the past half century. Its political character, however, was not impressed upon this revolution by the peasant movement; this movement merely gave it its great power. In the first announcements of the central executive committee of the Petersbourg workers' and soldiers' councils, the agrarian question was not even mentioned. But the peasants soon forced themselves upon the attention of the new government. Tired of waiting for it to take action in the agrarian question, in April and May of 1917 the disappointed peasant masses appropriated the land for themselves. The soldiers on the fronts, fearful of failing to get their proper share in the new distribution, abandoned the trenches and hurried back to their villages. They took their weapons with them, however, and thus assisted the new government in no possibility of restraining them. All its appeals to the sentiment of nationality and the sacrosanct of Russian interests
were of no avail against the urge of the masses to provide at last for their own economic needs. And those needs were embraced in peace and land. It was related at the time that peasants who were implored to remain on the front, as otherwise the Germans would occupy Moscow, were quite puzzled and answered the government thus: "And what's that to us? Why, we're from the Tamboff Government!"

Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not invent the winning slogan, "Land to the peasants"; rather, they accepted the real peasant revolution going on independently of them. Taking advantage of the vacillating attitude of the Kerensky regime, which still hoped to be able to settle the agrarian question by way of peaceful discussion, the Bolsheviks won the good-will of the peasants and were thus enabled to drive the Kerensky government out and take over the power themselves. But this was possible for them only as agents of the peasants! will, by sanctioning their appropriation of land, and it was only through their support that the Bolsheviks were able to maintain themselves in power.

The slogan "Land to the peasants" has nothing to do with communist principles. The cutting up of the large estates into a great number of small independent farming enterprises was a measure directly opposed to socialism, and which could be justified only on the ground of tactical necessity. The subsequent changes in the peasant policy of Lenin and the Bolsheviks were powerless to effect any change in the necessary consequences of this original opportunism to policy. In spite of all the collectivizing, which up to now is largely limited to the technical side of the productive process, Russian agriculture is still today basically determined by private economic interests and motives. And this involves the impossibility, in the industrial field as well, of arriving at more than a state-capitalist economy. Even though this state capitalism aims at transforming the farming population completely into exploitable agricultural wage workers, this goal is not at all likely to be attained in view of the new revolutionary encounters bound up with such a venture. The present collectivizing cannot be regarded as the fulfillment of socialism. This becomes clear when one considers that observers of the Russian scene such as Maurice Hindus hold it possible that "even if the Soviets were to collapse, agriculture would remain collectivized, with control more perhaps in the hands of the peasants than of the government". However, even if the bolshevist agricultural policy were to lead to the desired end, even a state capitalism extending to all branches of national economy, the situation of the workers would still remain unchanged. Nor could such a consummation be regarded as a transition to real socialism, since those elements of the population now privileged by the state capitalism would defend their privileges against all changes in exactly the same way as did the private owners previously at the time of the 1917 revolution.

The industrial workers still formed a very small minority of the population and were accordingly unable to impress upon the Russian revolution a character in keeping with their own needs. The bourgeoisie elements which likewise were combatting Czarism, soon recoiled before the nature of their own tasks. They could not accede to the revolutionary solution of the agrarian question, since a general expropriation of land might all too easily bring in its train the expropriation of industry. Neither the peasants nor the workers followed them and the fate of the bourgeoisie was decided by the temporary alliance between these latter groups. It was not the bourgeoisie but the workers who brought the bourgeois revolution to its conclusion; the place of the capitalists was taken over by the bolshevist state apparatus under the Leninist slogan: "If capitalism anyhow, then let's make it". Of course the workers in the cities had overthrown capitalism, but only in order now to convert the bolshevist party apparatus into their new masters. In the industrial cities the workers' struggle went on under socialist demands, seemingly independent of the peasant revolution under way at the same time and yet in a decisive sense determined by this latter. The original revolutionary demand of the workers was objectively incapable of being carried thru. To be sure, the workers were able, with the aid of the peasants, to win the state power for their party, but this new State soon took a position directly opposed to the workers' interests. An opposition which even today has assumed forms which actually make it possible to speak of a "Red Czarism": suppression of strikes, deportations, mass executions, and hence also the coming to life of new illegal organizations which are conducting a communist revolt against the present bogus socialism. The talk just now about an extension of democracy in Russia, the thought of introducing a sort of parliamentarianism, the resolution at the last soviet congress about dismantling the dictatorship, all this is merely a tactical maneuver designed to compensate for the governments latest acts of violence against the opposition. These promises are not to be taken seriously, but are an outgrowth of the Leninist practice, which was always well calculated to work both ways; and at the same time in the interests of stabil-
party is concerned with only one thing, namely, the exercise of state power at any price.

At this place, however, we are interested only in making clear that the Russian Revolution was not dependent on Lenin or on the Bolsheviks, but that the decisive element in it was the revolt of the peasants. It was the matter at issue in the conflict between capital and Labor. On the contrary, the Bolshevik government, in order to save its position in Russia, was obliged to yield to the demands and actual measures of the workers, who in their demands and actions went far beyond the Bolsheviks. It was only under the pressure brought to bear by the millions of peasant soldiers, our victory over the bourgeoisie would have been out of the question. The great interest of the peasants in the matter of land, the slight interest with reference to the question of government, enabled the Bolsheviks to conduct a victorious struggle for the control of production, and the workers who in their demands and actual measures went far beyond the Bolsheviks. It was not Lenin who conducted the revolution, but the revolution conducted him. Though as late as the October uprising, Lenin restricted his earlier and more thorough-going demands to that for control of production, and wished to stop short with the nationalization of the banks and transportation facilities, without the general abolition of private ownership, the workers paid no further attention to his views and expriated all enterprises. It is interesting to recall that the first decree of the Bolshevik government was directed against the wild, unauthorized expropriations of factories through the workers' councils. But these soviets were still stronger than the party apparatus, and they compelled Lenin to issue the decree for the nationalization of all industrial enterprises. It was only under the pressure brought to bear by the workers that the Bolsheviks consented to this change in their own plans. Gradually, through the extension of state power, the influence of the soviets became weakened, until today they no longer serve more than decorative purposes.

During the first years of the revolution, up to the introduction of the New Economic Policy (1921), there was actually of course some experimentation in Russia in the community sense. This is not, however, to be set down to the account of Lenin, but of those forces which made of him a political chameleon who at one time assumed a reactionary and at another a revolutionary color. New peasant uprisings against the Bolsheviks first drove Lenin to a more radical policy, a stronger emphasis upon the interests of the workers and the poor peasants who had come off short-handed in connection with the first distribution of land. But then this policy proves a failure since the poor peasants whose interests are thus preferred refuse to support the Bolsheviks and Lenin "turns the face again to the middle peasants". In such a case, Lenin has no scruples about strengthening the private-capitalist elements anew, and the earlier allies, who have now grown uncomfortable, are shot down with cannon, as was the case in Kronstadt.

The power, and nothing but the power; it is to this that the whole political wisdom of Lenin finally reduces. The fact that the paths along which it is attained, the means which lead to it, determine in their turn the manner in which that power is applied, was a matter with which he had very little concern. Socialism, to him, was in the last instance merely a kind of state capitalism, after the model of the "American postal service". And this state capitalism he overtook on his way, for in fact there was nothing else to be overtaken. It was merely a question of who was to be the beneficiary of the state capitalism, and here Lenin gave preference to none. And so George Bernard Shaw, returning from Russia, was quite correct when, in a lecture before the Fabian Society in London, he stated that in the communistic ideas this Russian revolution had put into practice of the Fabian program which we have been preaching the last forty years.

No one, however, has yet suspected the Fabians of containing a world-revolutionary force. And Lenin is, of course, first of all acclaimed as a world revolutionary, notwithstanding the fact that the present Russian government by which his "state" is administered, issues emphatic denial when the press publishes reports of Russian toasts to the world revolution, as happened recently in connection with reports of the New York Times on the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The legend of the world-revolutionary significance of Lenin receives its nourishment from his consistent international position during the World War. It was quite impossible for Lenin at that time to conceive that a Russian revolution would have no further repercussions and be abandoned to itself. There were two reasons for this view: first, because such a thought was, in contradiction with the objective situation resulting from the World War; and secondly, he assumed that the onslaught of the imperialist nations against the Bolsheviks would break the back of the Russian Revolution if the proletariat of Western Europe failed to come to the rescue. Lenin's call for the world revolution was
primarily a call for support and maintenance of bolshevik power. The proof that it was not much more than this is furnished by his inconsistency in this question: in addition to making his demands for world revolution, he at the same time came out for the "right of self-determination of all oppressed peoples", for their national liberation. This was his double-dealing bolshevism, likewise from the Jacobinical need of the Bolshevists for holding on to power. With both slogans the forces of intervention of the capitalist countries in Russian affairs was weakened, since their attention was thus diverted to their own territories and colonies. That meant a respite for the Bolshevists. In order to make it as long as possible, Lenin and the Bolshevists used their international. It set for itself a double task: on the one hand, to subordinate the workers of Western Europe and America to the will of Moscow; on the other, to strengthen the influence of Moscow upon the peoples of Eastern Asia. Work on the international field was modeled after the course of the Russian Revolution. The goal was that of combining the interests of the workers and peasants on a world-wide scale and control of them through the Bolshevists, by means of the Communist International. In this way at least the bolshevik state power in Russia received support; and in case the world revolution should really spread, the power over the world was to be won. Though the illusion was attended with an ambiguity to which time the second failed of accomplishment. The world revolution was unable to make headway as an enlarged imitation of the Russian, and the national limitations of the victory in Russia necessarily made of the Bolshevists a counter-revolutionary force on the international plane. Hence also the demand for the "world revolution" was converted into the "theory of the building of socialism in one country". And this is not a perversion of the Leninist standpoint—as Trotsky, for example, asserts today—but the direct consequence of the pseudo world-revolutionary policy pursued by Lenin himself.

It was clear at that time, even to many Bolsheviks, that the restriction of the revolution to Russia would make of the Russian Revolution itself a factor by which the world revolution would be impeded. Thus, for example, Eugene Varga wrote in his book "Economic Problems of the Proletarian Dictatorship", published by the Communist International (1931): "The danger exists that Russia may be cut out as the motive power of the international revolution.... There are communists in Russia who have grown tired of waiting for the European revolution and wish to make the best of their national isolation..... With a Russia which would regard the social revolution of the other countries as a matter with which it had no concern; that Russia may at any rate be able to live in peaceful neighborhood. I am far from believing that such a bottling up of revolutionary Russia would be able to stop the progress of the world revolution. But that progress would be slowed down." And with the sharpening domestic crisis in Russia around that time, it was not long before almost all communists, including Varga himself, had the feeling of which Varga here complains. In fact, still earlier, even in 1920, when Trotsky took pains to stem the revolutionary forces of Europe, Peace throughout the world was required in order to assure the building of state capitalism in Russia under the auspices of the Bolshevists. It was inadvisable to have the peace disturbed either by war or new revolutions, for in neither case a country like Russia was sure to be drawn in. Accordingly Lenin imposed, through splitting and intrigue, a neo-reformist course upon the labor movement of Western Europe, a course which led to its total dissolution. It was with sharp words indeed that Trotsky, with the approval of Lenin, turned on the uprising in Central Germany (1931): "We must flatly say to the German workers that we regard this philosophy of the offensive as the greatest danger and in its practical application as the greatest political crime". And in another revolutionary situation, in 1923, Trotsky declared to the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, again with the approval of Lenin: "We are of course interested in the victory of the working classes, but it is not at all to our interest to have the revolution break out in a Europe that is already weak and exhausted, and to have the proletariat receive from the hands of the bourgeoisie nothing but ruin. We are interested in the maintenance of peace". And ten years later, when Hitler seized power, the Communist International did not move a finger to prevent. Trotsky is not only in error, but reveals a failure of memory resulting no doubt from the loss of his uniform, when today he characterizes Stalin's failure to help the German communists as a betrayal of the principles of Leninism. This betrayal was constantly practised by Lenin and Trotsky himself. But according to a dictum of Trotsky's, the important thing is of course, not what he does, but what Stalin does. Stalin is, as a matter of fact, the best disciple of Lenin, insofar as concerns his attitude to German fascism. The Bolshevists have also, of course, not refrained from entering into alliances with Turkey and lending political and economic support to the government of that country even at a time when the sharpest measures were being taken there against the communists.—means which frequently eclipsed even the actions of a Hitler.

In view of the fact that the Communist International in so far as it continues to function is merely an agency for the Russian imperialist trade, in view of the collapse in all countries of the communist movement, controlled from Moscow, the legend of Lenin, the world-revolutionist, is no doubt sufficiently weakened that one may
of the already existing economic doctrines associated with Marxism. Lenin had absolutely no thought of claiming an independent theorist in matters of economics to him, Marx had already said everything fundamental in this field. Since, to his mind, it was quite impossible to go beyond Marx, he concerned himself with nothing further than proving that the marxist postulates were in accord with the actual development. His principal work on economics, "The Development of Capitalism in Russia", is eloquent testimony on this point. Lenin never wanted to be more than Marx's disciple, and so it is only in legend that one can speak of a theory of "Leninism".

Lenin wanted above all else to be a practical politician. His theoretical works are almost exclusively of a polemical nature. They combat the theoretical and other enemies of Marxism, which Lenin identifies with his own political strivings and those of the Bolsheviks generally. To Marxism, practice decides regarding the truth of a theory. As a practical endeavoring to actualize the doctrines of Marx, Lenin may have actually rendered Marxism an enormous service. However, as regards Marxism again, every practice is a social one, which can be modified and influenced by individuals only in very limited measure, never decisively. There is no doubt that the union of theory and practice, of final goal and concrete questions of the moment, with which Lenin was constantly concerned, may be acclaimed as a great accomplishment. But the criterion for this accomplishment is again the success which attends it, and that success, as we have already said, was denied to Lenin. His work not only failed to advance the world revolutionary movement; it also failed to form the preconditions for a truly socialist society in Russia. The success (such as it was) did not bring him nearer to his goal, but pushed it farther into the distance.

The actual condition in Russia and the present situation of the workers throughout the world ought really to be sufficient proof to any communist observer that the present "Leninist" policy is just the opposite of that expressed by its phraseology. And in the long run such a condition must without doubt destroy the artificially constructed Lenin Legend, so that history itself will finally set Lenin in his proper historical place.

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