THE alleged purpose of Trotsky's biography of Stalin* is to show "how a personality of this sort was formed, and how it came to power by usurpation of the right to such an exceptional role." The real purpose of the book, however, is to show why Trotsky lost the power position he temporarily occupied and why his rather than Stalin's name should follow Lenin's. Prior to Lenin's death it had always been "Lenin and Trotsky"; Stalin's name had invariably been near or at the end of any list of prominent Bolsheviks. On one occasion Lenin even suggested that he put his own signature second to Trotsky's. In brief, the book helps to explain why Trotsky was of the opinion "that he was the natural successor to Lenin" and in effect is a biography of both Stalin and Trotsky.

All beginnings are small, of course, and the Bolshevism of Lenin and Trotsky differs from present-day Stalinism just as Hitler's brown terror of 1933 differed from the Nazism of World War II. That there is nothing in the arsenal of Stalinism that cannot also be found in that of Lenin and Trotsky is attested to by the earlier writings of Trotsky himself.* For example Trotsky, like Stalin, introduced compulsory labor service as a "socialist principle." He, too, was convinced "that not one serious socialist will begin to deny to the Labor State the right to lay its hands upon the worker who refuses to execute his labor power." It was Trotsky who hurried to stress the "socialistic character" of inequality, for, as he said, "those workers who do more for the general interest than others receive the right to a greater quantity of the social product than the lazy, the careless, and the disorganizers." It was his opinion that everything must be done to "assist the development of rivalry in the sphere of production."

Of course, all this was conceived as the "socialist principle" of the "transformation period." It was dictated by objective difficulties in the way of full socialization. There was not the desire but the need to strengthen party dictatorship until it led to the abolishment of even those freedoms of activity which, in one fashion or another, had been granted by the bourgeois state. However, Stalin, too, can offer the excuse of necessity.

In order to find other arguments against Stalinism than his personal dislike for a competitor in intra-party struggles, Trotsky must discover and construct political differences between himself and Stalin and between Stalin and Lenin in order to support his assertion that without Stalin things would have been different in Russia and elsewhere. There could not have been any "theoretical" differences between Lenin and Stalin, as the only theoretical work bearing the name of the latter had been inspired and supervised by Lenin. And if Stalin's "nature craved" the centralized party machine, it was Lenin who constructed the perfect machine for him, so that on that score, too, no differences could arise. In fact, as long as Lenin was active, Stalin was no trouble to him, however troublesome he may have been to "The Number Two Bolshevik."

Still, in order for Trotsky to explain the "Soviet Thermidor," there must be a difference between Leninism and Stalinism, provided, of course, there was such a Thermidor. On this point, Trotsky has brought forth various ideas as to when it took place, but in his Stalin biography he ignores the question of time in favor of the simple statement that it had something to do with the "increasing privileges for the bureaucracy." However, this only brings us back to the early period of the Bolshevik dictatorship which found Lenin and Trotsky engaged in creating the state bureaucracy and increasing its efficiency by increasing its privileges.

Competitors for Power

The fact that the relentless struggle for position came into the open only after Lenin's death suggests something other than the Soviet Thermidor. It simply indicates that by that time the Bolshevist state was of sufficient strength, or was in a position, to disregard to a certain degree both the Russian masses and the international bourgeoisie. The developing bureaucracy began to feel sure that Russia was theirs for keeps; the fight for the plums of the Revolution entered its more general and more serious stage.

All adversaries in this struggle stressed the need of dictatorship in view of the unsolved internal frictions between "workers" and "peasants," the economic and technological backwardness of the country as a whole, and the constant danger of attack from the outside. But within this setting of dictatorship, all sorts of arguments could be raised. The power-struggle within the developing ruling class expressed itself in policy-proposals either for or against the interests of the peasants, either for or against the limitation of factory councils, either for or against an offensive policy on the international front. High-sounding theories were expounded with regard to the estimation of the peasantry, the relationship between bureaucracy and revolution, the question of party generations, etc. and reached their climax in the Trotsky-Stalin controversy on the "Permanent Revolution" and the theory of "Socialism in one Country."

It is quite possible that the debaters believed their own phrases; yet, despite their theoretical differentiations, whenever they acted upon a real situation they all acted alike. In order to suit their own needs, they naturally expressed identical things in different terms. If Trotsky rushes to the front—to all fronts in fact—he merely defends the fatherland. But Stalin "is attracted by the front, because here for the first time he could work with the most finished of all the administrative machines, the military machine" for which, by the way, Trotsky claims all credit. If Trotsky pleads for discipline, he shows his "iron hand"; if Stalin does the same,

*Bolshevism and Stalinism. An appraisal of the man and his influence. Edited and translated from the Russian by Charles Malamuth. (Harper, $5) The first seven chapters and the appendix, that is, the bulk of the book, Trotsky wrote and revised himself. The last four chapters, consisting of notes, excerpts, documents, and other raw materials, have been edited.

* See for instance, L. Trotsky's "Dictatorship vs. Democracy," New York, 1922; particularly from page 135 to page 150.
he deals with a “heavy hand.” If Trotsky’s bloody suppression of the Kronstadt Rebellion was a “tragic necessity,” Stalin’s suppression of the Georgian independence movement is in the manner of a “great-Russian Russifier, riding roughshod over the rights of his own people as a nation.” And vice versa: suggestions made by Trotsky are called false and counter-revolutionary by Stalin’s henchmen; when carried out under Stalin’s auspices, they become additional proof of the great leader’s wisdom.

To understand Bolshevism, and in a narrower sense Stalinism, it is not enough to follow the superficial and often silly controversies between Stalinists and Trotskyites. After all, the Russian Revolution embraces more than just the Bolshevik Party. It was not even initiated by organized political groups but by spontaneous reactions of the masses to the breakdown of an already precarious economic system in the wake of military defeat. The February upheavals “started” with hunger riots in market places, protest strikes in factories, and the spontaneous declaration of solidarity with the rioters on the part of the soldiers. But all spontaneous movements in modern history have been accompanied by organized forces. As soon as the collapse of Czarism was imminent, organizations came to the fore with directives and definite political goals.

If prior to the Revolution Lenin had stressed organization rather than spontaneity, it was because of the retarded Russian conditions, which gave the spontaneous movements a backward character. Even the politically advanced groups offered only limited programs. The industrial workers desired capitalistic reforms similar to those enjoyed by the workers in more capitalistically advanced countries. The petty-bourgeoisie and important layers of the capitalist class wanted a Western bourgeois democracy. The peasants desired land in a capitalist agriculture. Though progressive for Czarist Russia, these demands were of the essence of bourgeois revolution.

The new liberalistic February government attempted to continue the war. But it was the conditions of war against which the masses were rebelling. All promised reforms within the Russian setting of that time and within the existing imperialistic power relationships were doomed to remain empty phrases; there was no way of directing the spontaneous movements into those channels desired by the government. In new upsurges the Bolsheviks came into power not by way of a second revolution but by a forced change of government. This seizure of power was made easy by the lack of interest that the restless masses were showing in the existing government. The October coup, as Lenin said, “was easier than lifting a feather.” The final victory was “practically achieved by default . . . Not a single regiment rose to defend Russian democracy . . . The struggle for supreme power over an empire that comprised one-sixth of the terrestrial globe was decided between amazingly small forces on both sides in the provinces as well as in the two capital cities.”

The Bolsheviks did not try to restore the old conditions in order to reform them, but declared themselves in favor of the concrete results of the conceptually backward spontaneous movements: the ending of the war, the workers’ control of industry, the expropriation of the ruling classes and the division of land. And so they stayed in power.

The pre-revolutionary demands of the Russian masses had been backward for two reasons: they had long been realized in the main capitalist nations, and they could no longer be realized in view of existing world conditions. At a time when the concentration and centralization process of world capitalism had brought about the decline of bourgeois democracy almost everywhere, it was no longer possible to initiate it afresh in Russia. If laissez faire democracy was out of the question, so were all those reforms in capital-labor relations usually related to social legislation and trade-unionism. Capitalist agriculture, too, had passed beyond the breaking up of feudal estates and production for a capitalist market to the industrialization of agriculture and its consequent incorporation into the concentration process of capital.

The Bolsheviks & Mass Spontaneity

The Bolsheviks did not claim responsibility for the Revolution. They gave full credit to the spontaneous movements. Of course, they underlined the obvious fact that Russia’s previous history, which included the Bolshevik party, had lent some kind of vague revolutionary consciousness to the unorganized masses and they were not backward about asserting that without their leadership the course of the Revolution would have been different and most probably would have led to a counter-revolution. “Had the Bolsheviks not seized power,” writes Trotsky, “the world would have had a Russian name for Fascism five years before the March on Rome.”

But counter-revolutionary attempts on the part of the traditional powers failed not because of any conscious direction of the spontaneous movements, not because of Lenin’s “sharp eyes, which surveyed the situation correctly,” but because of the fact that these movements could not be diverted from their own course. If one wants to use the term at all, the “counter-revolution” possible in the Russia of 1917 was that inherent in the Revolution itself, that is, in the opportunity it offered the Bolsheviks to restore a centrally-directed social order for the perpetuation of the capitalistic divorce of the workers from the means of production and the consequent restoration of Russia as a competing imperialist power.

During the revolution, the interests of the rebelling masses and of the Bolsheviks merged to a remarkable degree. Beyond the temporary merger, there also existed a deep unity between the socializing concepts of the Bolsheviks and the consequences of the spontaneous movements. Too “backward” for socialism but also too “advanced” for liberal capitalism, the Revolution could end only in that consistent form of capitalism which the Bolsheviks considered a pre-condition of socialism, namely, state-capitalism.

By identifying themselves with the spontaneous movement they could not control, the Bolsheviks gained control over this movement as soon as it had spent itself in the realization of its immediate goals. There were many such goals differently reached in different territories. Various layers of the peasantry satisfied, or failed to satisfy, divergent needs and desires. Their interests, however, had no real connection with those of the proletariat. The working class itself was split into various groups with a variety of specific needs and general plans. The petty-bourgeoisie had still other problems to solve. In brief, there was a spontaneous unity against the conditions of Czarism and war, but there was no unity in regard to immediate goals and future policy. It was not too difficult for the Bolsheviks to utilize this social division for building up their own power, which finally became stronger than the whole of society because it never faced society as a whole.
Like the other groups which asserted themselves within the revolution, the Bolsheviks, too, pressed forward to gain their particular end:—the control of government. This goal reached farther than those aspired to by the others. It involved a never-ending struggle, a continuous winning and re-winning of power positions. Peasant groups settled down after dividing the land, workers returned to the factories as wage-laborers, soldiers, unable to roam the country-sides forever, returned to the life of peasant and worker, but for the Bolsheviks the struggle only really began with the success of the Revolution. Like all governments, the Bolshevik regime involves submission of all existing social layers to its authority. Slowly centralizing all power and control into their hands, the Bolsheviks were soon able to dictate policy. Once more Russia became thoroughly organized in the interests of a special class—the class of privilege in the emerging system of state-capitalism.

The Party “Machine”

All this has nothing to do with Stalinism and “Thermidor” but represents Lenin’s and Trotsky’s policy from the very day they came to power. Reporting to the Sixth Congress of Soviets in 1918, Trotsky complained that “Not all Soviet workers have understood that our administration has been centralized and that all orders issued from above must be final. . . . We shall be pitiless with those Soviet workers who have not yet understood; we will remove them, cast them out of our ranks, pull them up with repressions.” Trotsky now claims that these words were aimed at Stalin who did not co-ordinate his war-activity properly and we are willing to believe him. But how much more directly must they have been aimed at all those who were not even “second-rate” but had no rating at all in the Soviet hierarchy. There already existed, as Trotsky relates, “a sharp cleavage between the classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.” Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit of exceptional claims that these words were aimed at Stalin who did not openly disagree with him and carried out his wishes. “Counter-revolutionary.” Without comparing the statistics of those tortured and killed under both regimes, we will admit that the Bolshevik regime under Lenin and Trotsky was not strong enough to carry through such Stalinist measures as enforced collectivization and slave-labor camps as a main economic and political policy. It was not design but weakness which forced Lenin and Trotsky to the so-called New Economic Policy, that is, to concessions to private-property interests and to a greater lip-service to “democracy.”

Bolshevik “toleration” of such non-bolshevik organizations as the Social Revolutionists in the early phase of Lenin’s rule did not spring, as Trotsky asserts, from Lenin’s “democratic” inclinations but from inability to destroy all non-bolshevik organizations at once. The totalitarian features of Lenin’s Bolshevism were accumulating at the same rate at which its control and police power grew. That they were forced upon the Bolsheviks by the “counter-revolutionary” activity of all non-bolshevik labor organizations, as Trotsky maintains, can not of course explain their further increase after the crushing of the various non-conformist organizations. Neither could it explain Lenin’s insistence upon the enforcement of totalitarian principles in the extra-Russian organizations of the Communist International.

Trotsky, Apologist for Stalinism

Unable to blame non-bolshevik organizations entirely for Lenin’s dictatorship, Trotsky tells “those theoreticians who attempt to prove that the present totalitarian regime of the U. S. S. R is due . . . to the ugly nature of bolshevism itself, that they forget the years of Civil War, “which laid an indelible impress on the Soviet Government by virtue of the fact that very many of the administrators, a considerable layer of them, had become accustomed to command and demanded unconditional submission to their orders.” Stalin, too, he continues, “was molded by the environment and circumstances of the Civil War, along with the entire group that later helped him to establish his personal dictatorship.” The Civil War, however, was initiated by the international bourgeoisie. And thus the ugly sides of Bolshevism under Lenin, as well as under Stalin, find their chief and final cause in capitalism’s enmity to Bolshevism which, if it is a monster, is only a reluctant monster, killing and torturing in mere self-defense.

And so, if only in a round-about-way, Trotsky’s Bolshevism, despite its saturation with hatred for Stalin, leads in the
end merely to a defense of Stalinism as the only possible self-defense for Trotsky. This explains the superficiality of the ideological differences between Stalinism and Trotskyism. The impossibility of attacking Stalin without attacking Lenin helps to explain, furthermore, Trotsky's great difficulties as an oppositionist. Trotsky's own past and theories preclude on his part the initiation of a movement to the left of Stalinism and condemned "Trotskyism" to remain a mere collecting agency for unsuccessful Bolsheviks. As such it could maintain itself outside of Russia because of the ceaseless competitive struggles for power and positions within the so-called "communist" world-movement. But it could not achieve significance for it had nothing to offer but the replacement of one set of politicians by another. The Trotskyist defense of Russia in the Second World War was consistent with all the previous policies of this, Stalin's most bitter, but also most loyal, opposition.

Trotsky's defense of Stalinism does not exhaust itself with showing how the Civil War transformed the Bolsheviks from servants into masters of the working class. He points to the more important fact that it is the "bureaucracy's law of life and death to guard the nationalization of the means of production and of the land." This means that "in spite of the most monstrous bureaucratic distortions, the class basis of the U. S. S. R. remains proletarian." For awhile—we notice—Stalin had Trotsky worried. In 1921, Lenin had been disturbed by the question as to whether the New Economic Policy was merely a "tactic" or an "evolution." Because the NEP released private-capitalistic tendencies, Trotsky saw in the growing Stalinist bureaucracy "nothing else than the first stage of bourgeois restoration." But his worries were unfounded; "the struggle against equality and the establishment of very deep social differentiations has so far been unable to eliminate the socialist consciousness of the masses or the nationalization of the means of production and the land, which were the basic social conquests of the revolution." Stalin, of course, had nothing to do with this, for "the Russian Thermidor would have undoubtedly opened a new era of bourgeois rule, if that rule had not proved obsolete throughout the world."

**The Result: State Capitalism**

With this last statement of Trotsky's we approach the essence of the matter under discussion. We have said before that the concrete results of the revolution of 1917 were neither socialist nor bourgeois but state-capitalistic. It was Trotsky's belief that Stalin would destroy the state-capitalist nature of the economy in favor of a bourgeois economy. This was to be the Thermidor. The decay of bourgeois economy all over the world prevented Stalin from bringing this about. All he could do was to introduce the ugly features of his personal dictatorship into that society which had been brought into existence by Lenin and Trotsky. In this way, and despite the fact that Stalin still occupies the Kremlin, Trotskyism has triumphed over Stalinism.

It all depends on an equation of state-capitalism with socialism. And although some of Trotsky's disciples have recently found it impossible to continue making the equation, Trotsky was bound to it, for it is the beginning and the end of Leninism and, in a wider sense, of the whole of the socialist-democratic world-movement of which Leninism was only the more realistic part. Realistic, that is, with regard to Russia. What was, and still is, understood by this movement under "workers' state" is governmental rule by the party; what is meant by "socialism" is the nationalization of the means of production. By adding control over the economy to the political control of the government the totalitarian rule over all of society emerges in full. The government secures its totalitarian rule by way of the party, which maintains the social hierarchy and is itself a hierarchical institution.

This idea of "socialism" is now in the process of becoming discredited, but only because of the experience of Russia and similar if less extensive experiences in other countries. Prior to 1914, what was meant by the seizure of power, either peacefully or violently, was the seizure of the government machinery, replacing a given set of administrators and lawmakers with another set. Economically, the "anarchy" of the capitalistic market was to be replaced by a planned production under the control of the state. As the socialist state would by definition be a "just" state, being itself controlled by the masses by way of the democratic processes, there was no reason to expect that its decisions would run counter to socialist ideals. This theory was sufficient to organize parts of the working class into more or less powerful parties.

The theory of socialism boiled down to the demand for centralized economic planning in the interest of all. The centralization process, inherent in capital-accumulation itself, was regarded as a socialistic tendency. The growing influence of "labor" within the state-machinery was hailed as a step in the direction of socialism. But actually the centralization process of capital indicated something else than its self-transformation into social property. It was identical with the destruction of laissez-faire economy and therewith with the end of the traditional business-cycle as the regulator of the economy. With the beginning of the 20th century the character of capitalism changed. From that time on it found itself under permanent crisis conditions which could not be resolved by the "automatic" workings of the market. Monopolistic regulations, state-interferences, national policies shifted the burden of the crisis to the capitalistically under-privileged in the world-economy. All "economic" policy became imperialistic policy, culminating twice in world-wide conflagrations.

In this situation, to reconstruct a broken-down political and economic system meant to adapt it to these new conditions. The Bolshevik theory of socialization fitted this need in an admirable way. In order to restore the national power of Russia it was necessary to do in a radical fashion what in the Western nations had been merely an evolutionary process. Even then it would take time to close the gap between the Russian economy and that of the Western powers. Meanwhile the ideology of the socialist movement served well as protection. The socialist origin of Bolshevism made it particularly fitted for the state-capitalist reconstruction of Russia. Its organizational principles, which had turned the party into a well-functioning institution, would re-establish order in the country as well.

The Bolsheviks of course were convinced that what they were building in Russia was, if not socialism, at least the next best thing to socialism, for they were completing the process which in the Western nations was still only the main trend of development. They had abolished the market-economy and had expropriated the bourgeoisie; they also had gained complete control over the government. For the Russian workers, however, nothing had changed; they were merely faced by
another set of bosses, politicians, and indoctrinators. Their position equalled the workers’ position in all capitalist countries during times of war. State-capitalism is a war-economy, and all extra-Russian economic systems transformed themselves into war-economies, into state-capitalistic systems fitted to the imperialistic needs of modern capitalism. Other nations did not copy all the innovations of Russian state-capitalism but only those best suited to their specific needs. The second world war led to the further unfolding of state-capitalism on a world-wide scale. The peculiarities of the various nations and their special situations within the world-power frame provided a great variety of developmental processes towards state-capitalism.

The fact that state-capitalism and fascism did not, and do not grow everywhere in a uniform manner provided Trotsky with the argument of the basic difference between bolshevism, fascism and capitalism plain and simple. This argument necessarily stresses superficialities of social development. In all essential aspects all three of these systems are identical and represent only various stages of the same development—a development which aims at manipulating the mass of the population by dictatorial governments in a more or less authoritarian fashion, in order to secure the government and the privileged social layers which support it and to enable those governments to participate in the international economy of today by preparing for war, waging war, and profiting by war.

Trotsky could not permit himself to recognise in Bolshevism one aspect of the world-wide trend towards a fascist world economy. As late as 1940 he held the view that Bolshevism prevented the rise of Fascism in the Russia of 1917. It should have long since been clear, however, that all that Lenin and Trotsky prevented in Russia was the use of a non-Marxian ideology for the fascist reconstruction of Russia. Because the Marxian ideology of Bolshevism merely served state-capitalistic ends, it, too, has been discredited. From any view that goes beyond the capitalist system of exploitation, Stalinism and Trotskyism are both relics of the past.

London Letter
THE FIRST 18 MONTHS

Today we are enduring an industrial crisis in Britain. The ostensible cause is the failure of coal supplies to meet the requirements of factories and power stations. And undoubtedly this is one of the contributory causes, in that industrial production is actually increasing at a greater rate than the production of coal. But the basic cause lies in the lack of incentive among the workers, an inarticulate but paralysing lack of faith in the present social structure, which prevents them from working with greater energy.

The Labour Government has been in power for eighteen months, and still the miners and other industrial workers find that their economic position is as bad as ever. The general standard of wages, in comparison with the cost of living, is such that very few married workers can do more than just make ends meet. On the other hand, there is little reason to work longer hours, since any extra money earned is subjected to a heavy income tax. Added to this, for the present the classic capitalist whip of unemployment is comparatively remote from the majority of the workers. In consequence, men and women in many occupations, particularly miners, textile workers and railwaymen, who are economically badly off in comparison with skilled industrial workers, are certainly not working to full capacity. Go-slow campaigns on the railways are on the increase, and the Christmas period saw a very high record of absenteeism among miners and transport workers.

These facts become even more significant when it is remembered that the workers who appear to show most apathy towards the government’s appeals for harder work are those who are most closely involved in nationalisation schemes. The coal mines became “vested in the people” at the beginning of this year. The railways are due for nationalisation under the Transport Bill which is now going through its various parliamentary stages. But neither miners nor railway workers seem inclined to give nationalisation a preliminary vote of confidence by working any harder during the transition period.

The British workers, in fact, seem to be losing their faith in the State as a provider of concrete amenities. The muddle of food and housing questions, the continued scarcity and high prices of goods, the divergence of living standards between rich and poor which is growing to pre-war proportions, are all causes for increasing discontent, at present represented rather in apathy than in active resentment.

As yet it is impossible to make any adequate assessment of the actual effect of nationalisation on the lives of the workers, since in the first major industry to come under government control, coal mining, the scheme has only been in operation for some six days as I write this letter. However, we can draw certain conclusions from the set-up of this first nationalised large-scale industry, and we can also make some comments on the conditions of workers already in various kinds of government employment of an industrial nature.

As I have shown in previous letters, the various boards which control the nationalised coal industry are composed of a miscellany of interested individuals, held to represent the people in general. Financiers, discredited politicians, retired generals, elderly coal magnates and trade union leaders who have climbed into the peerage rub shoulders in the strangest galaxy of incompetence that could be imagined. In this situation it is inevitable that the colliery executives, who are in many cases ex-owners and almost always the former capitalist managers, should continue to wield effective control in the industry. As for the workers, they are merely changing employers, since they have virtually no say in the conduct of the industry. It is unlikely that they will find the new master and man relationship any better for a nominal change of ownership, and they will undoubtedly begin very soon to feel resentful at a mock socialization which in fact does not provide any of the means for workers’ control towards which the British miners have been attracted ever since the days when syndicalism was a powerful force in the industry.

The present condition of workers already in government employment was shown by some recent figures published by the Ministry of Labour. These compare the wage-rates of 16 major industries in 1946 with those of 1938. The lowest increase of all is shown to be that of employees in Government industrial establishments, whose wages have increased by only 52%, as compared with a general average increase of 89%. Before the war, Government industrial employees stood at the head of the list of industries. Now they have fallen to fifth place among the sixteen categories. These facts show that it is more difficult to gain better conditions from the State even than from private employers, and that the State, because of its greater power, can better afford to risk industrial strife than could the individual capitalist. This conclusion is underlined by the fact that the only union in Britain which